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and confirm the opinion produced by his previously published works, that he is a faithful disciple and distinguished exponent of Hegelianism. We learn here, what perhaps was not so easy to gather elsewhere, that it is from this philosophical stand-point that Professor Wallace apprehended and interpreted all facts and problems of practical life, of religion and morality. We learn, also, that to his other great intellectual gifts he joined that of an earnest, unwearied, and impassioned preacher of the doctrine in which he believed.

This reiteration and enlargement of previous opinion is very impressive, and seems to stamp very vividly in the reader's mind the general character of Wallace's philosophical view. If the effect here may be compared to that produced by a somewhat similar phenomenon in another department of imagination, I would liken it to the feeling one has after walking through an exhibition of Burne-Jones's pictures,—what remains in the mind, prominent above all other impressions, is that of the one face or type which, young or old, man or woman, sad or happy, is reproduced on every canvas, even, as it sometimes seems, in portraits of living men and women. In this there is both strength and weakness, and the gain in intensity of impression is to some extent counterbalanced by loss of adaptation to the infinite variety of reality.

E. E. C. JONES.

GIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT: A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History. By Simon N. Patten, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, University of Pennsylvania. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. Pp. 409.

England since the Reformation has been kept by the silver sea so free from foreign invasion, and the life of her people has been able so tranquilly to hold on its way unmolested, that English civilization is in that epoch more "normal" than that of any other nation (Preface, v.). Normal development begins in a struggle for possession of the good things of this life, including the means of defence,—a struggle leading to the survival of those best suited to their environment, the environment consisting in the aggregate of such good things. A race changes its conceptions of what is desirable or necessary; different objects become goods to it. The environment thus changed, there is a change in the character of the survivors: "the motives, instincts, and habits of the race are modified."

Such changes take place in a regular order, in an ascertainable series, which "repeats itself in each environment." In the elucidation of this series consists the economic interpretation of history (Preface, vi., vii.).

Such is our author's starting-point. We need not enter deeply into his psychology, which is novel only in its terminology. There is a stimulus from without and there is a reaction against it. The apparent simplicity of the above conception of development soon disappears. "Men in progressive nations are never adjusted to their environment, if this word is to mean the sum of natural conditions which at a given time obtain in a nation. On the contrary, the striking features of every progressive nation are due to the breach between the national character and the present environment. Character is formed by the motor reactions which are created by the perception of certain sensory ideas. These motor reactions are the result of hereditary adjustment. They are slowly formed and still more slowly changed" (12). In other words, our character is made not merely by our own acts, but by the acts of our grandparents. There are therefore two "elemental forces always at work;" first, those due to the national character; second, those due to the present economic conditions. If these two are in harmony, the condition is "static"; if otherwise, we have the struggle of a period of transition; and whatever changes either of the two elemental forces will cause such a struggle (13, 14).

We might think from this account that Professor Patten's interpretation of history was, by many degrees, less narrow than that of Professor Loria or Karl Marx, for there are infinite possibilities of variety in a "motor reaction." The interpretation is, in fact, less narrow; but there is on Professor Patten's part a constant desire to make it narrow, if he can. In spite of his really wide grasp of human nature, he says, for example, "National character depends on the peculiarities of the locality in which the race was formed" (18); though he presently relieves our minds by saying that without an exchange of ideas with other races no one race will have continuous progress, and both imitation (in Tarde's sense) and conversion must go on to the benefit of the exchangers, the exchangers preserving all the time a certain similarity in the types that are so modified; a single environment could develop only one type of men (18-21, 41).

The Professor's analysis of the "types" is one of the chief features of his book. He tells us not to classify men by their wealth or their

place in society, but by their mental characteristics (22). One group represents the men that depend on each other for support and leadership. They are "clingers," and their ancestors lived, we may suppose, in a sort of oasis, where food was strictly limited to particular localities, and where, accordingly, the whole mind of the people was concentrated on that spot and feared any movement away from it (23, 24). Where local conditions allowed of more movement, a different type, the "sensualists," would come into being,—men able to indulge appetite over a wider range, and therefore emboldened to venture forth for fresh means of indulgence, yet, from the needs of the case, disciplined and under control (25, 26).

These types reappear; but, in more advanced nations, a third would be added, the type of "stalwarts," or thoughtful enthusiasts, who measure and calculate, and love dogmas and doctrines and fixed limits of their own drawing (27, 28). In order to last, the stalwarts must have been "frugalists;" at first, even ascetics (29). Later still, in nations of more wealth and leisure, we have the thoughtful men who are not enthusiasts,—the men who "peep and botanize upon their mother's grave;" who dissect, analyze, and criticise for the love of it: the "mugwumps" (30, 31). These are the four permanent types of men, into which all others are resolved (33). Thus, the sensualists, to our surprise, include the warriors, priests, and capitalists (34). We need not have been surprised; we have here only one instance out of many where an old fact is disguised under a new term, or, to speak more strictly, under a perverted old term. In terminology, Professor Patten is a law to himself.

It is, as a rule, possible to gather his meaning in spite of his language; and there seems to be no ambiguity in such statements as the following, which give the essence of the book: "The history of thought has four stages, each of which has peculiarities of its own and must be studied by itself. The economic stage comes first, because its aggregates are the smallest and most capable of substitution. The æsthetic stage follows, in which the increments of economic welfare are united into harmonious groups. Later, the environment is conceived of as a unit, and its relations, when perceived, become moral rules. And, finally, other environments peopled with dissimilar beings are recognized, and upon this basis religion grows up. When a new environment is entered, this series of changes repeats itself,"—in a form complicated by the deposits of the preceding. The economic stage becomes doubly important

for a while, till a reaction gives higher forms of thought a higher place than ever (42, 43). "In studying an epoch the economic conditions must be studied first, then the economic doctrines that follow from them, and, last, the æsthetic, moral, and religious ideas which follow from them" (44). "History, to be valuable, must be studied in epochs, and each group of ideas be connected with its roots in the underlying conditions, and not with its antecedents in the same group" (45),—that is to say, the ethical thought of one age, for example, must not be explained by the ethical thought of the preceding age, but by the economic basis of its own age. The explanation of a "group of ideas" is in the end economic. Hence we find Professor Patten turning upside down the ordinary accounts: first, of the philosophy of Hobbes (144 *seq.*), and, second, of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Hume to Kant (158 *seq.*). Hobbes's notion of the *bellum omnium contra omnes* was a pure after-thought "to bring the social sciences into harmony with his philosophical system" (146). "Before he had thought of the state of war, he found the natural motives for submitting to government in the love of peace, and in the economic motives that the love of well-being creates" (151). So our author will not allow that T. H. Green could rightly give the thought of Locke, "the first mugwump," (186), from the logic of his doctrines, still less that of Hume (212 *seq.*). In a purely empirical manner, it is true, the Professor allows that "a motor reaction, after losing its primal economic importance, responds to abstract instead of concrete phenomena" (51), but it begins in the concrete. "Even the Christianity of Germany at the Reformation was a group of foreign ideas impressed upon the German consciousness by the pressure of economic conditions" (103). Strange to say, "the Reformation could not have happened at a more unfortunate time" (104) than it did; and, strange to say, the final blending of the philosophies of Locke and Hume was an accident (213). It is clear that this economic interpretation of history falls very far short of a philosophy of history.

To do him justice, Professor Patten does not attempt the greater task. He is content to take the history of England since the Reformation and divide it into three stages: first, that of the Calvinists, stalwarts in reaction against sensualists, with Hobbes and afterwards Locke in reaction against them in their turn (ch. iii.); second, that of the moralists, with Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith bringing economics to light out of ethics (ch. iv.); and,

third, that of the Economists (ch. v.), Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill, and John Mill. As has already been mentioned, we get some new readings of philosophical history. Hume is said to have got from Mandeville his view of reason as the slave of the passions, and to have recoiled from that position eventually in order to overtake his contemporaries (224)! The importance of the "Wealth of Nations" is its bearing on natural theology: "The old optimism was based on the thought that wickedness is always punished. The new economic optimism was based on the thought that the righteous are always rewarded" (242). Adam Smith thus became the means of reconciling men that had been fitted for the old environment of the Calvinists to the new environment created by the industrial revolution (243). Our author sometimes speaks as if the industrial revolution was in an advanced state at the beginning of the century. "The new religious movement of Whitefield and Wesley was the proper complement to the industrial changes of the eighteenth century," the new economic conditions being, indeed, the cause of the success of the religious movement (248). Over Methodism Professor Patten is sympathetic and suggestive, dropping, however, even here such paradoxes as the following (270): "An intensive religion, losing sight of the interests of the imperfect, demands only the success and survival of the perfect."

Our author follows his bent in regarding the French Revolution of 1789 as of no special importance. "The struggle of France was really a struggle for wheat," and began in 1757, when there was a short crop (278). Wheat was talked of in England in the eighteenth century as if nothing else were worth cultivating. "The struggle for equality," in which every man was to have enough wheat, and no more than enough (enough being a peck a week), "was the necessary consequence of this idealization of bread, and the French revolution must be regarded as a veritable bread-riot" (280). Between 1757 and 1873 the curve of wheat was also the curve of French power, and, when wheat is at its lowest, the power of France has also sunk to its lowest place (278, 283, 285). The French were placed in the same relation to England as Ireland had always been; the great wars ending in 1815 decided that England shall always have the bread, and should have the first choice when there is a general deficiency or a race for the best supplies (285). Our author thinks rightly that wheat was valued beyond its merits, but it is not that he thinks little of food as an economic element. There is perhaps no other that

has, in his opinion, such an overmastering influence on human character and destiny.

This is not the place for a full discussion of the Economists. In John Mill, Professor Patten rests, to a large extent, satisfied. John Mill brought economics back to religion (331 *seq.*, *cf.* 364). The Utilitarians of the Old School are unmercifully handled (272, 293 *seq.*). Ricardo was the teacher of James Mill, but it was James Mill who "brought the ideas of Bentham and Ricardo down from the clouds" and gave them practical influence (311, 313). These are by no means the most disputable statements in our author's account of the Economists.

The result of the struggle of the Economists with the rival types of men is sufficiently cheerful. "Religion has gradually divorced itself from asceticism, and utilitarianism from sensualism, until the two occupy the same field and have the same rules of conduct. The religious and the economic motives and ideals are felt by the same men, and the forces that make society economic also make it religious" (366). We—the English-speaking race, English and Americans—are "no longer cosmopolitans who wish to merge our civilization in that of the world. We think of ours as the civilization, and seek to impress our standards and ideals on others." Yet we have no common environment; the unity of the race is an ideal unity, and what they seek to gain is a social Utopia (366, 367). In this view those who are farthest from the materialistic view of history might cordially agree; and their only difficulty would be to reconcile the position with the dogma of the overpowering influence of foods and drinks, clothing and lodging, not only on individual character but on national character, and not only on the life of the individual but on the future of the race (*e.g.*, 380).

We are told that even in the struggle between the drinkers of strong drinks and the abstainers "the real issue is economic, and it will work itself out with little regard for other considerations" (381). Progress by elimination has changed its form. "Formerly, the underfed failed to survive; now it is the overfed among whom the elimination is taking place" (382), more especially the women (384, top). The remedy is to devote less time to selfish gratification and more to promoting the welfare of others; those who follow this advice will survive, and the others will be eliminated (406). It is, indeed, easy to believe this if we can hold with our author that "bad judgments in the end eliminate the persons who act on them" (401).

Professor Patten is always thoughtful, and is always (so far as he is aware) independent in his thinking. He has given us a body of observations on men and things that it will be well for writers on the philosophy of history to keep in mind. The present generation of economists and philosophers seems thus far to be capable of nothing beyond tentative efforts to consider economic history philosophically. From Bagehot to Patten, it would be hard to point to a single success in this field. But to have contributed a helpful draft, however rough, must be accounted some service both to philosophy and to economics.

J. BONAR.

LONDON.

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY. By Achille Loria. Translated from the second French edition by Lindley M. Keasbey. With a new preface by the author. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. x., 385.

There is a kind of arithmetical exercise which was familiar to us in the school-room, which consists in "simplifying" a long jumble of arithmetical expressions. If we succeeded, we knew that we could reduce the bewildering mass of figures and letters to a bald statement of the type $2 + 5 = 7$; but if perverse fractions and decimals persisted we had not got our "answer." It is a process like this which M. Loria attempts to apply to the complicated phenomena of society; but he has the advantage of working by prophecy, and if an irrational element persists he assures us that it will drop out in the future. That future will be an ideal society of a type even simpler than the one above; it will be more like one + one + one; homogeneous units all pursuing the same calling, and actuated by one simple motive—Egoism.

For him all the more complex manifestations of social life are nothing but confusions and obscurations of the simple economic force, and can be "reduced" to this both in theory and in fact. "The positive theory of capitalistic property makes it possible to reduce the most diverse manifestations of social life to their lowest terms and analyze them scientifically" (p. 384). We are shown how, when once an irrational element, such as capitalism, appears it leads to other irrational elements such as morality, law, and politics; but we are not shown how, starting from the simple one plus one, human relations ever entered upon such a tangled way, nor